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Abstract 
 Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and 
generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear 
material.  The most commonly used technique for performing active interrogation is to use an electronic neutron 
generator as the probe radiation source.  Exploiting the unique operating characteristics of these devices, including 
their monoenergetic neutron emissions and their ability to operate in pulsed modes, presents a number of options for 
performing prompt and delayed signature analyses using both photon and neutron sensors.  A review of literature in 
this area shows multiple applications of the active neutron interrogation technique for performing nuclear 
nonproliferation measurements.  Some examples include measuring the plutonium content of spent fuel, assaying 
plutonium residue in spent fuel hull claddings, assaying plutonium in aqueous fuel reprocessing process streams, and 
assaying nuclear fuel reprocessing facility waste streams to detect and quantify fissile material.  This paper discusses 
the historical use of this technique and examines its context within the scope and challenges of next-generation 
nuclear fuel cycles and advanced concept nuclear fuel cycle facilities. 
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Introduction 
 For over 15 years Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported research and development programs 
focusing on active interrogation to assess objects and containers and identify the presence of certain materials 
including chemical warfare agents, special nuclear material, and high explosives.[1 -5]  This work has used both 
neutron and photon (bremsstrahlung) sources and has ranged from small portable systems to large fixed 
installations.  Nuclear instrumentation used in these programs has included traditional radiation measurement 
equipment including organic and inorganic scintillators, gas filled detectors, and solid-state detectors as well as more 
advanced equipment and techniques including neutron imaging systems, high-speed waveform digitization and 
signal processing, and multiplicity analysis.  With the intention of leveraging this knowledge, research at INL is now 
underway to explore opportunities where active interrogation might be of use in support of research initiatives into 
next-generation nuclear fuel cycles and advanced concept nuclear fuel cycle facilities, including facilities for 
proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel reprocessing. 
 These initiatives involve exploratory research related to nuclear power in the areas of advanced nuclear fuel 
and involve the development of research demonstration facilities related to advanced nuclear fuel cycles.  These 
facilities include an advanced reactor, a fuel treatment facility, and a fuel cycle research and development facility.  
Critical to the success of this program will be the ability to demonstrate that effective and affordable solutions can 
be found to meet the nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safeguards monitoring instrumentation requirements.  
Challenges in this area will be more difficult than previously encountered in fuel reprocessing facilities built around 
the world because the advanced fuels to be used in these initiatives will be hybridized mixtures of not only uranium 
and plutonium but also other transuranic elements including americium, neptunium, and curium.  The presence of 
these extra materials adds complexity to the safeguards problem because to varying degrees these materials possess 
inherent nuclear attributes similar to plutonium including undergoing spontaneous fission, their susceptibility to 
undergo fission following neutron absorption, the emission of high energy alpha particles (which can generate 
neutrons through (?,n) reactions), and the emission of both low and higher energy gamma rays.  Historically, many 
of the tools used to safeguard fuel reprocessing facilities have relied on measuring one or more of these properties to 
detect and quantify the presence of plutonium in samples.  The presence of interferences that also contribute to these 
signatures means that many of the historical tools and techniques used in nuclear safeguards must be modified or 
redesigned to be able to provide plutonium specificity in the presence of Am, Np, and Cm.  Active interrogation 
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techniques, which use external radiation sources to excite nuclear processes in materials, may help in addressing 
these challenges because inherently weak signatures are amplified under active interrogation and, by using pulsed 
radiation fields, active interrogation can investigate time-correlated signatures which passive signature techniques 
generally cannot. 
 In addition to nuclear safeguards a second important challenge in the next generation fuel cycle facilities 
will be to extend current industrial process monitoring instrumentation and controls technologies for use in high 
radiation and restricted access environments.  In many cases there is a significant overlap between measurements 
useful for nuclear safeguards and measurements useful for monitoring the processes in nuclear fuel reprocessing; 
combining redundant plant measurements useful for both safeguards and process monitoring purposes may result in 
significant savings in labor and hardware costs.  Also, by integrating process measurements into the safeguards 
process following the ‘safeguards by design’ philosophy a more integrated and more complete assessment of the 
compliance of a facility with its safeguard requirements can be ascertained.[6]
 Today’s industrial nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities at Sellafield, UK, Cadarache, France, and Rokkasho, 
Japan are large and complicated installations; next generation fuel reprocessing facilities may also be similar in size 
and complexity to these installations.  In order to efficiently operate these plants a large quantity of information is 
needed to control different process streams and to monitor the performance of processes to make sure they are 
performing in accordance with their design specifications.  Monitoring these processes can be both labor and 
instrumentation intensive; however, active interrogation can also play a role in support of process monitoring in 
future facilities.  Because active interrogation measurements can be performed without contacting material process 
streams active interrogation is an ideal solution for performing on-line monitoring in areas where the process 
streams are hazardous or difficult to contain, and where the consequences of spills and contamination are high.  
Also, since active interrogation measurements can be made without contacting process streams directly, 
instrumentation maintenance and repair can be performed without the need to break into these process streams or 
impact plant operations.  Finally, since active interrogation measurements and techniques are inherently designed for 
operating in high radiation fields they are particularly well-suited for implementation in nuclear fuel reprocessing 
environments. 
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Active Interrogation in Nuclear Process Monitoring and Safeguards 
 Active interrogation as a tool for nuclear safeguards and process monitoring in the nuclear fuel cycle has 
been the subject of many research projects and has been explored in nearly every aspect of the reprocessing 
cycle.[7]  A simple flow sheet showing the major steps involved in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is shown in 
Figure 1 together with examples of where active interrogation has been used for process monitoring and for 
safeguards measurements.  However, active interrogation monitoring techniques have not seen widespread 
application in today’s fuel reprocessing facilities, most likely because alternate technologies have been found to 
achieve the same goals and because active techniques are typically more complicated and more expensive than 
comparable passive techniques.  In order to meet the demanding needs of next generation reprocessing facilities 
though active interrogation techniques may be the only means of providing process monitoring and safeguards 
answers in some cases.  The following paragraphs provide some historical examples of the use of active 
interrogation in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. 
 Irradiated Fuel Assay – A critical safeguards variable that must be known in a fuel reprocessing facility is 
the quantity of plutonium entering the facility in the incoming spent nuclear fuel.  This is a difficult parameter to 
measure and in many instances it is determined analytically based upon numerical estimates of fuel burn-up from the 
originating facility where the fuel was used.  In contrast to these numerical estimates active interrogation has been 
explored as a means of directly measuring the special nuclear material content of spent nuclear fuel.[8,9,10,11,12]
One particularly promising active interrogation technique for assaying spent nuclear fuel is the lead slowing-down 
spectrometry (LSDS) technique.  LSDS takes advantage of the fact that there is a difference in the fission cross-
sections of 235U and 239Pu at 0.3 eV due to a plutonium neutron fission resonance. The LSDS technique uses a large 
assembly of lead to slowly moderate a monoenergetic neutron ensemble, generated using an accelerator (either a 
neutron generator or an electron accelerator that produces neutrons via photonuclear reactions), from fast to thermal 
energies.  Neutron detectors embedded within the lead assembly are used measure the neutron flux inside the 
assembly as the ensemble passes through the 0.3 eV range.  Quantifying this value and then normalizing it to 
measurements taken when the neutron ensemble reaches the thermal neutron energy range (0.025 eV) can then be 
used to infer the uranium and plutonium contained within the assembly.  A measurement precision of better then 5% 
has been reported with this technique for measurements of 30 minutes duration.  
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 Leached Cladding Hulls Analysis – An early step in fuel reprocessing is the mechanical separation 
(shearing) of the incoming fuel assemblies and the dissolution of the spent fuel contained within the metal fuel 
assembly rod pieces.  The shearing process is typically done with a large mechanical chopper which cuts the fuel 
assembly rods into short lengths of a few inches or less.  The dissolution process is typically carried out using strong 
nitric acid (or electrochemically).  When the process is complete the dissolved spent fuel/nitric acid solution 
proceeds to the radiochemical separations process.  The metal fuel rod casings, or hulls, which do not dissolve in 
this acid are then dried and melted and cast into waste ingots for permanent disposal.  However, there is a possibility 
that not all of the spent fuel has been removed from these hulls and safeguards measurement must be made to 
quantify the residual plutonium still in the hulls; since the hulls themselves are highly radioactive after their 
residence in a nuclear reactor this is a difficult measurement.  Typically spent fuel hulls are assayed by small-lot 
grab sampling of the inventory of chopped hulls.  In contrast to this approach, active interrogation techniques have 
been developed to perform complete assays of the entire inventory of leeched hulls.[13,14,15,16,17]  Results at the 
THORP plant in the UK have demonstrated this technique to be capable of achieving good measurement precisions 
over a range of from 20 – 350 g of residual fissile material quantities in leached hull. 
 Process Monitoring – In addition to monitoring and assessing plutonium and fissile material content 
entering and exiting a reprocessing facility there is also utility in measuring a) the fissile material content in process 
streams within a reprocessing plant and b) the chemistry and material content in support process streams within a 
reprocessing plant.  Process stream information can be used to identify if non-standard operating conditions exist 
within a plant that may be indicative of proliferation activities.  In addition, process monitoring can also be used to 
control in-plant activities to increase plant efficiency, increase material throughput, and reduce operating costs.  A 
few trial experiments have been reported of using active interrogation for process monitoring.[18,19,20]  Typically 
these instruments use neutron sources as the probe radiation and then, for fissile material analysis, use delayed 
neutron counting to infer fissile material masses.  These instruments have been shown to be capable of measuring 
uranium or plutonium concentrations of ~10 grams per Liter in just a few minutes with measurement uncertainties of 
~10%; they have also been used to measure lower fissile concentrations with a similar precision but with longer 
counting times.  
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Active Interrogation at INL
 As a first step towards developing a safeguards focused active interrogation research capability at INL, 
scoping experiments were performed in December of 2007 to investigate a technique for receipt inspections to 
confirm the presence of SNM in a Department of Transportation (DOT) 6M drum.a  These experiments served a 
dual role within INL’s active interrogation program and were also used to examine interrogation techniques useful 
for shielded SNM detection.  For these experiments three shipping drums were used; one contained 30 kg of 
depleted uranium (DU); one contained 4 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (oxide fuel rodlets, 40% enriched 
235U), and the third contained 8 kg of the same HEU material.b
 The detectors used in these experiments included a 2 m2 array of helium-3 filled proportional counters.  The 
proportional counters were located within polyethylene moderators that were encased within cadmium and boron to 
shield the gas tubes against thermal neutrons generated outside of the detector assemblies.  The detector arrays were 
assembled in two sections and placed on opposite sides of the 6M drums.  The active interrogation source for these 
experiments was a Thermo Electron MP320 electronic neutron generator (ENG) that produced a monoenergetic 
neutron spectrum of 2.5 MeV neutrons with an intensity of roughly 2 x 106 neutrons per second.  The 6M drums 
were positioned with their axis of symmetry parallel to the ground.  The neutron generator was roughly centered on 
the top of the drums for active interrogation; the generator was pulsed at a rate of 300 Hz with a pulse width of 166 
microseconds.   Measurements were taken for a duration of approximately 40 minutes, measuring the die-away 
neutron intensity in between neutron pulses, presented in Figure 2.  The two top plots in this figure show the 
standard die-away neutron signature following the DD ENG pulse (left) and a cumulative counts plot starting at 350 
microseconds after the NG pulse start time (right).  Below these plots are corresponding plots showing the measured 
signature of counting pairs-of-counts in the He-3 array when pairs occur less then 650 microseconds apart.  The 
signal from 0 – 350 microseconds is essentially a result of fast neutrons from the neutron generator slowing down 
within the detector’s moderating structure and then being counted by the He-3 tubes.  Neutrons from 350 – 2000 
microseconds are a combination of fission neutrons from the test object still being generated as neutrons are 
undergoing moderation in the assembly, and delayed neutrons from the fission product beta-delayed neutron 
emitters (the die-away region).  At times greater then 2000 microseconds the neutron signature is dominated by the 
a These experiments were performed with researchers from Oak Ridge National Laboratory ORNL).  INL 
collaborators included B. Blackburn, S. Watson, J. Johnson, E. Seabury, D. Norman, K. Haskell, B. Bennett, and B. 
Brush.  ORNL collaborators included P. Hausladen, J. Mihalczo, and S. McConchie. 
b These fuel rodlets were from INL’s zero power physics reactor (ZPPR). 
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beta delayed neutron emitters fission products and the detectors inherent background count rate (the delayed neutron 
region). 
   Reviewing these plots there is a clear signature that is observable in the die-away region from both DU and 
HEU that is above the background signature.  In the delayed neutron region the HEU signature presents a significant 
change over the background signature but it is not nearly as large as that seen during the die-away region.  Taking 
advantage of the inherent background rejection achieved through the use of paired pulse counting, as seen in the 
lower plots of Figure 2, a further improvement in signal-to-noise is seen in the die-away of this data versus the 
single pulse counts.   Placing a signal requirement of +3? over the background to determine the lower detection 
limit (LDL), the single pulse counting technique would have a LDL of 564 g DU and 20.5 g HEU (40% enriched 
235U).  The paired pulse counting technique would have a LDL of 401 g DU and 4.2 g HEU (40% enriched 235U).  
These values could be further improved through the use of a more intense ENG, or perhaps a deuterium-tritium 
ENG producing 14.1 MeV neutrons, or by counting for a longer period.  Also, a custom designed detector system 
and improved irradiation geometry would serve to improve the detection efficiency of these techniques.  
Summary
 There are many cases where active interrogation may be used to help answer material control and 
accountability questions within advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities.  At INL work is proceeding towards applying 
active neutron interrogation technology to find measurement solutions for multiple questions related to advanced 
fuel cycle facilities.21  In particular, work is investigating solutions related to spent fuel receipt and inventory, cold 
and hot stream process monitoring, and waste form fissile material assessment.  These investigations will be carried 
out in consultation with experts in aqueous and electrochemical reprocessing in order to identify unique situations 
associated with advanced fuel cycle facilities (which will incorporate transuranic elements in the final fuel forms) 
that have not been previously encountered in other aqueous reprocessing facilities associated with uranium fuel 
remanufacturing or mixed-oxide fuel manufacturing. 
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Major steps in the fuel recycling process and areas where active interrogation has been used for process monitoring 
and safeguards measurements. 
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Figure 2  Die-away time spectra and cumulative event spectra (beginning 350 microseconds after the start of the 
neutron pulses) from the He-3 array for both single count events and paired counting events (events separated by 
less than 650 microseconds) measuring the active background, the 6M Drum signature containing 30 kg DU, and the 
6M Drum signature while containing 8 kg of HEU. 
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